

Abstracts

Danish Reactions to the Brexit Process

Henrik Larsen, professor MSO,
Department of Political Science,
University of Copenhagen, hl@ifs.ku.dk

The article analyses the Danish reactions to the Brexit-process. It shows that the Danish government was very supportive of the British attempts to renegotiate its terms of membership of the EU. Moreover, Denmark has been amongst the countries which wanted a very close relationship between the EU and the UK after Brexit. Copenhagen has been one of the governments which have worked most strongly for a quick start to the negotiations about the future relationship between the UK and the EU. However, the general reaction of the Danish government has to be understood within the framework of what is labelled the essential cooperation discourse. The EU has been seen as central to Danish policy including foreign policy and its continued existence and ability to function has been the primary Danish priority in the Brexit process. The Danish support to the UK during the process has, therefore, not been at the expense of the Danish commitment to the EU and its fundamental principles.

EU After Brexit

Marlene Wind, professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Copenhagen, mwi@ifs.ku.dk

This article explores what kind of EU, the Brexit-process can lead to, with the main argument being that Brexit might lead to a new momentum for European cooperation. Looking firstly at the predictions that arose in the wake of Brexit and the election of Trump, it is found, that the argued “domino-effect theory” overemphasized how more EU countries would either hold exit referenda as well or at least take a more skeptical position to the EU. The results of the elections in Austria, France and Germany contradicted this, as did numerous Eurobarometer surveys showing increased support for the EU after Brexit. Secondly, it is discussed how Brexit will hit suggesting that it will be the UK itself, that will face the greatest difficulties from the separation from the EU. It is also argued, that the rest of the EU is more concerned with what direction the EU should take from here, as Brexit is not really seen as damaging the future potentials of the EU. In here, Macron’s reform plans and the renewed Franco-German collaboration attest to a future EU marked by differentiation and enhanced co-

operation for those who want to but centered around the Eurozone countries. What Brexit and the lead by Macron have gone to show is, that Europe is more likely to enhance the countries' sovereignty rather than reduce it when collaboration is intensified.

The consequences of the EU-UK future trading arrangements: The soft, hard and brutal Brexit

Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, associate professor, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, jlm@ifs.ku.dk

What are the economic consequences of Brexit? Few dispute its negative consequences, and yet the expected long term costs are uneven and uncertain. The UK will be relatively worse off. The article looks at various scenarios and estimations for the future UK-EU trading relationship. Three main scenarios are identified: the soft, hard and brutal Brexit. The soft Brexit will minimize the economic disruption by allowing for near-frictionless trade. The hard Brexit entails a complicated UK-EU free trade arrangement. Yet, the devil is in the details. Especially the inclusion of financial services will be critical. The brutal Brexit resets the trading arrangement to the basic WTO arrangements. Much of the impact depends on whether the UK opt for full future trade sovereignty, capable of striking independent trade deals with its trading partners, at the expense of near-frictionless trade with the EU. A customs union-like, regulatory aligned trading arrangement needs to be anchored in an extensive EU-UK trade agreement. This appears to offer the most feasible and least disruptive model. It too will be politically difficult, however. A brutal but irrational Brexit cannot be dismissed entirely. Any solution hinges on whether current political promises are accepted both parties as

credible assurances in lieu of legally enforceable rules of the Single Market in the future.

European Security and Defence Policy After Brexit

Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, professor, Head of Department, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, mvr@ifs.ku.dk

Brexit has confirmed a renationalization of defense and security policy that has taken place over a number of years. At the same time, Brexit has been the impetus for a number of integration initiatives in the EU and increased cooperation with EU-NATO. These two trends are not necessarily contradictory. A French initiative on an intervention agreement can tap into both renationalization and increased integration. The background condition for these developments is a tendency to increase the defense budget and a higher priority of security policy in European policy. For Denmark, this development is not without challenges due to the Danish defense opt-out. However, Denmark has strong opportunities to cooperate at the bilateral level. Therefore, it is crucial for Denmark whether the UK will be able to create bilateral defense cooperation as well as in a NATO context after Brexit.

Divergent trends in British and Danish Euroscepticism

Karsten Tingleff Vestergaard, Ph.d.-student, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, ktv@thinkeuropa.dk

Short-term explanations indicate that some of the main motives behind the result of the Brexit referendum indicated a desire to take back

control of legislation, immigration and of the borders. Over time, however, The population in Britain has been more Eurosceptic than the other member states. An attempt to explain why Brexit happened must therefore begin with an explanation of the long run development in Euroscepticism.

Analysing the attitude towards membership among the right and left-wing reveals anomalies in the British Euroscepticism. As opposed to the majority of member states, where Euroscepticism is strongest on the left- and right-wing, the leftist British are now the least sceptic. This development has primarily been imposed by increasing Euroscepticism among the right-wing and moderate Brits. Why Euroscepticism in Britain is not a phenomenon of the right- and left-wing, but rather broadly anchored in the population might be explained by their two-party system and their self-understanding.

British exceptionalism: How Brexit could be interpreted in the light of history

Peter Nedergaard, professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Copenhagen, pne@ifs.ku.dk

Maja Friis Henriksen, Research Assistant,
Department of Political Science,
University of Copenhagen,
majafriishenriksen@hotmail.com

In an attempt to understand the surprising British EU-exit, the early ‘first mover’-literature has resorted to contemporary factors behind the result of the British referendum on June 23, 2016. This article argues that the British history must be included if we are to fully understand the British withdrawal from the European Union. As a starting point for a historical analysis of Brexit, this article draws on the concept of exceptionalism and compares historical peculiarities of Britain to Continental Europe. Hence, the article argues that Brexit is better understood with an eye to the British peculiarities during history. In this sense, we find that the first contribution to understanding Brexit is placed in the remote past.